> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.kairos.trade/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Submit a signed Hyperliquid spot↔perp transfer (step 2 of 2) > Forwards your signed `usdClassTransfer` to Hyperliquid. Because the move is internal to your own account, the blast radius is far smaller than a withdrawal — but the same mechanics apply: no Kairos-side idempotency, `time` doubles as the nonce, and replay protection is Hyperliquid's alone. The `400 Hyperliquid rejected transfer: …` conflates venue rejection with network failure, exactly as on withdraw. **Auth & scope.** Requires `trade:execute` for `hyperliquid`, wallet ownership, and the mutation gate. Not rate limited. ## OpenAPI ````yaml /openapi/execution.yaml post /exchanges/hyperliquid/transfer openapi: 3.1.0 info: title: Kairos Order Execution API version: 1.0.0 summary: >- Order entry, cancellation, fee quotes, and live position exposure across venues. description: > The Order Execution API at `execution.kairos.trade` places and manages orders across every venue Kairos integrates. Two lanes: - **Custodial** (`POST /orders`) — Kairos signs and routes on your behalf (custodial signing). Async ack: a 200 means validated + enqueued; track via `GET /orders/{order_id}` or the WebSocket order/fill stream. - **Self-custody / external signing** (`POST /v2/orders/intent` + `POST /v2/orders/submit`) — for allow-listed institutional accounts on Polymarket and Predict.fun: Kairos builds the EIP-712 payload, you sign with your own key, submission is synchronous with the venue's verbatim result. `POST /v2/onchain/intent` + `POST /v2/onchain/submit` are the same pattern for on-chain operations (approvals, redeem, split/merge, unwrap) on Polygon, where you also pay the gas. ## Authentication All endpoints require a Kairos API key (`X-Client-Id` + `X-Api-Key` + `X-Api-Secret`) or a first-party session JWT, plus the per-operation scope (`trade:execute`, `trade:read`, `position:read`) where the operation documents one. Synthetic Books accepts any otherwise-valid account credential without an extra scope or allowlist. There is no anonymous tier. Scope checks apply to API-key credentials only; a session JWT carries no scope list and is treated as holding every scope. The custodial mutation endpoints (`POST /orders`, the three cancel endpoints) and Synthetic Books create/refresh/release carry an additional `RequireServiceToken` gate satisfied by **any** of: the full API-key triple, an internal `X-Service-Token`, or a valid `X-Csrf-Token`. API-key consumers need no extra header — but a bare `Authorization: Bearer ` alone is NOT sufficient on those routes. The `/v2/orders/*` and `/v2/onchain/*` external-signing routes have no such gate: a session JWT alone works there. ## Rate limits Order submission is capped per user (default 5 orders per **second**, sliding window, `ORDER_RATE_LIMIT_PER_SEC`); some credentials carry an `orders` override, which is enforced on its own per-credential window of the same duration *in addition to* the per-user window — either one denying is a `429`. Idempotent replays (same `client_order_id`) return the existing order before the limiter runs and never consume a slot. The limiter is Redis-backed and **fails closed**: if Redis is unreachable the submission is denied with `429`. Separately, repeated *authentication failures* from one client IP are throttled at 10 failures per 60 s (also fail-closed). That limiter returns the minimal `{"error": "Too many authentication attempts"}` body. **No rate-limit headers.** This service does not emit `Retry-After`, `X-RateLimit-*`, or any other backoff hint on a `429` — back off on your own schedule. ## Error responses **Six different error body shapes are in use across this service and they are not interchangeable.** Check the shape documented on the specific operation before writing a parser; a client that assumes one shape will read `undefined` for the reason on the others. 1. `OrderErrorResponse` — the structured envelope (`error`, `code`, `error_details{code,message,details?,metadata?,actions}`) returned by every handler that surfaces an `ExecutionError`/`ApiError`: order submission, cancel-all, the CTF endpoints, the Polymarket/Opinion onboarding endpoints, Hyperliquid withdraw/transfer, and most of the deposit-wallet family. Note the two `code` fields differ in case: top-level `code` is PascalCase (`"AuthInsufficientScope"`), while `error_details.code` is the SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE wire code (`"AUTH_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE"`). Match on `error_details.code`. 2. `OrderSimpleErrorResponse` — the minimal `{"error": "..."}` (sometimes with `code`) used by the auth middleware (any endpoint's `401`/`403`/`429`), the whole `/v2/*` external-signing and on-chain lane, the Kalshi and Predict.fun endpoints. 3. `OrderMarketLinkErrorResponse` — `{"message": "..."}`, with no `error` and no `code`. Used by `POST /orders/market-links` **only**. 4. **Empty or plain-text, not JSON at all.** Several deposit-wallet endpoints — most importantly the RPC signed-batch submission and `POST /exchanges/polymarket/imported/relay-info` — return most 4xx/5xx responses with a **completely empty body** and `content-type: text/plain`. A handful of cases carry a bare plain-text sentence (`batch is not an allowed withdrawal or collateral conversion`, `relayer rejected batch: …`). Do not attempt to JSON-parse these. 5. Handlers whose Rust signature returns a bare `StatusCode` likewise send **no body at all**; those responses are marked "empty body (status code only)". 6. `SyntheticBookErrorResponse` — `{"error": "stable_snake_case_code", "message": "...", "details"?: {...}}` on `/v1/synthetics*`. Match the top-level `error`; upstream definition validation may be nested under `details`. A further wrinkle inside shape 1: some provider-access checks discard the specific reason and return a generic `"Request failed with status 403"` / `AUTH_CREDENTIALS_INVALID` body, while others preserve `AUTH_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE` and the real message. Do not rely on the message text of an access denial being stable. The central `ExecutionError` → HTTP mapping (`ApiError::from`) is: | `ExecutionError` | Status | `error_details.code` | |---|---|---| | `InsufficientBalance` | 400 | `FUNDS_INSUFFICIENT_USDC` | | `CollateralLocation` | 400 | `FUNDS_COLLATERAL_LOCATION` | | `InvalidOrder` | 400 | `VALIDATION_INVALID_ORDER` | | `PositionShortfall` | 400 | `FUNDS_INSUFFICIENT_BALANCE` | | `MarketClosed` | 400 | `EXCHANGE_POLYMARKET_MARKET_CLOSED` | | `OrderAlreadyCancelled` | 400 | `VALIDATION_INVALID_ORDER` | | `UnsupportedExchange` | 400 | `EXCHANGE_UNSUPPORTED` | | `SlippageExceeded` | 400 | `MARKET_FOK_NOT_FILLED` | | `FokNotFilled` | 400 | `MARKET_FOK_NOT_FILLED` | | `AuthenticationError` | 401 | `AUTH_CREDENTIALS_INVALID` | | `CredentialError` | 401 | `AUTH_CREDENTIALS_NOT_FOUND` | | `MarketNotFound` | 404 | `VALIDATION_MARKET_NOT_FOUND` | | `OrderNotFound` | 404 | `VALIDATION_INVALID_ORDER` | | `MarketNotSettledOnChain` | 409 | `VALIDATION_MARKET_NOT_SETTLED_ON_CHAIN` | | `OrderbookUnavailable` | 422 | `ORDERBOOK_UNAVAILABLE` | | `ExchangeError` (code `429`/`RATE_LIMITED`) | 429 | `EXCHANGE_POLYMARKET_RATE_LIMITED` | | `ExchangeError` (code `401`/`UNAUTHORIZED`) | 401 | `AUTH_POLYMARKET_API_KEY_INVALID` | | `SigningError` | 500 | `SIGNATURE_ERROR` | | `DatabaseError` | 500 | `DATABASE_ERROR` | | `InternalError` / `LedgerReconciliationRequired` / `SponsoredRequestWedged` / `PreTradeError` | 500 | `INTERNAL_ERROR` | | `NetworkError`, `ExchangeError` (any other code) | 502 | `NETWORK_ERROR` / venue-classified | | `LockError` | 503 | `INTERNAL_ERROR` | | `Timeout` | 504 | `NETWORK_TIMEOUT` | A venue `ExchangeError` is further classified from the venue's own message text before it is mapped, so an "allowance is not enough" rejection becomes `ALLOWANCE_CTF_NOT_SET`, a "not enough balance" rejection becomes `FUNDS_INSUFFICIENT_BALANCE`, "post-only mode" becomes `MARKET_NOT_READY`, a "no liquidity" rejection becomes `MARKET_INSUFFICIENT_LIQUIDITY`, and so on. Match on `error_details.code`, never on `error`. ## Server-level guards Every request is subject to a 120 s timeout (`OE_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECS`), a 2 MiB request-body cap (`OE_MAX_BODY_BYTES`, over-size bodies get `413`), and a 1024-request global concurrency ceiling (`OE_MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS`). Every response carries `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `X-Frame-Options: DENY`, HSTS, and a `default-src 'none'` CSP. ## Conventions - Prices are decimal strings on the 0–1 scale; `*_bps` fields are the same value in basis points (× 10000). - Quantities/sizes are decimal strings. - Structured errors carry `error_details.code` (SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE) plus actionable recovery `actions`. ## Changelog **2026-09-14 — collateral routing fields on `POST /orders`.** Four optional request fields and one optional response field. `collateral` (`skip` | `check` | `fund`) **defaults to** `skip`, which is exactly today's path: no affordability check, no hold, no funding, zero added latency — so no existing caller changes behaviour without opting in. `shard_funding` **defaults to** `true`, which is also exactly today's behaviour: the Kalshi shard move is same-venue, zero-fee and already runs for every account; send `false` to opt out. `collateral=fund` requires both `max_bridge_fee_usdc` and `max_funding_wait_ms` and is rejected `400` naming the missing cap; either cap without `fund` is likewise a `400`. The response gains `funding`, `null` whenever no funding work ran. FIX sessions carry the same fields on `NewOrderSingle(D)` as optional tags `5701`–`5704`; a session that sends none of them is unchanged. contact: name: Kairos url: https://app.kairos.trade/docs/api-reference termsOfService: https://kairos.trade/terms servers: - url: https://execution.kairos.trade description: Production (central primary, us-east-1) - url: https://eu-west-1-polymarket.executor.kairos.trade description: >- Production regional execution node — Ireland, colocated with Polymarket. Same API surface; assigned at onboarding. - url: https://ap-northeast-1-predictfun.executor.kairos.trade description: >- Production regional execution node — Tokyo, colocated with Predict.fun. Same API surface; assigned at onboarding. - url: https://staging-execution.kairos.trade description: Staging security: - apiKeyClientId: [] apiKeyKey: [] apiKeySecret: [] paths: /exchanges/hyperliquid/transfer: post: tags: - Hyperliquid summary: Submit a signed Hyperliquid spot↔perp transfer (step 2 of 2) description: >- Forwards your signed `usdClassTransfer` to Hyperliquid. Because the move is internal to your own account, the blast radius is far smaller than a withdrawal — but the same mechanics apply: no Kairos-side idempotency, `time` doubles as the nonce, and replay protection is Hyperliquid's alone. The `400 Hyperliquid rejected transfer: …` conflates venue rejection with network failure, exactly as on withdraw. **Auth & scope.** Requires `trade:execute` for `hyperliquid`, wallet ownership, and the mutation gate. Not rate limited. operationId: submitHyperliquidTransfer requestBody: required: true content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/OrderHyperliquidTransferRequest' responses: '200': description: The transfer was submitted. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/OrderHyperliquidActionResponse' '400': description: >- `ValidationInvalidOrder` — invalid user id, `Invalid withdraw amount: …`, or `Invalid transfer signature: …`. **Also** `InternalError` with message `Hyperliquid rejected transfer: …` (venue rejection or network failure, indistinguishable). content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/OrderErrorResponse' '401': $ref: '#/components/responses/ExecUnauthorized' '403': description: >- Missing scope, provider access disabled, or wallet not owned by the caller. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/OrderErrorResponse' '500': description: '`DatabaseError`.' content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/OrderErrorResponse' '503': description: API-key access to `hyperliquid` could not be checked (fails closed). content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/OrderErrorResponse' components: schemas: OrderHyperliquidTransferRequest: type: object required: - wallet_address - amount - time - to_perp - signature properties: wallet_address: type: string amount: type: string time: type: integer format: int64 to_perp: type: boolean signature: type: string description: >- 0x-prefixed 65-byte signature from the MAIN wallet. Hyperliquid forbids agent wallets from class transfers, so a Kairos-held agent key cannot sign this. OrderHyperliquidActionResponse: type: object description: >- Response for `POST /exchanges/hyperliquid/withdraw` and `POST /exchanges/hyperliquid/transfer`. required: - success - message properties: success: type: boolean message: type: string description: >- `Withdrawal submitted` or `Transfer submitted`. Submission only — not a confirmation of settlement. OrderErrorResponse: type: object description: >- Standard structured error body returned by every endpoint that surfaces an `ExecutionError`/`ApiError` (order submission, cancel-all, and the other endpoints noted as returning this schema). Endpoints noted as "empty body (status code only)" do NOT use this shape. required: - error - error_details properties: error: type: string description: >- Same text as `error_details.message`, kept for backwards-compatible consumers. code: type: string nullable: true description: >- Debug-formatted copy of `error_details.code` (e.g. `"FundsInsufficientUsdc"` — PascalCase, NOT the SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE wire code in `error_details.code`). error_details: $ref: '#/components/schemas/OrderErrorDetails' OrderErrorDetails: type: object description: >- Structured, machine-readable error payload shared across order-execution error responses. required: - code - message - actions properties: code: $ref: '#/components/schemas/OrderErrorCode' message: type: string description: Human-readable error message. details: type: string nullable: true description: Optional extended explanation. metadata: nullable: true description: >- Error-type-specific structured metadata (shape varies by `code` — e.g. `{type: "insufficient_funds", required, available, currency, shortfall}` or `{type: "rate_limit", retry_after_seconds, limit, window}`). Untagged union; treat as opaque unless you match on the embedded `type` field. additionalProperties: true actions: type: array description: Zero or more actionable recovery steps a client can surface. items: $ref: '#/components/schemas/OrderErrorAction' OrderErrorCode: type: string description: Machine-readable error code, SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE on the wire. enum: - AUTH_CREDENTIALS_NOT_FOUND - AUTH_CREDENTIALS_INVALID - AUTH_POLICY_OUTDATED - AUTH_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE - AUTH_POLYMARKET_API_KEY_INVALID - AUTH_TURNKEY_WALLET_NOT_FOUND - AUTH_TURNKEY_AUTH_FAILED - AUTH_TURNKEY_SIGNING_FAILED - VALIDATION_INVALID_ORDER - VALIDATION_INVALID_PRICE - VALIDATION_INVALID_SIZE - VALIDATION_MARKET_NOT_FOUND - VALIDATION_TOKEN_NOT_FOUND - VALIDATION_ORDER_EXPIRED - VALIDATION_MARKET_NOT_SETTLED_ON_CHAIN - AUTH_IDENTITY_MISMATCH - FUNDS_INSUFFICIENT_USDC - FUNDS_INSUFFICIENT_GAS - FUNDS_INSUFFICIENT_TOTAL - FUNDS_INSUFFICIENT_BALANCE - FUNDS_COLLATERAL_LOCATION - ALLOWANCE_USDC_NOT_SET - ALLOWANCE_CTF_NOT_SET - ALLOWANCE_APPROVAL_FAILED - NETWORK_RPC_ERROR - NETWORK_TIMEOUT - NETWORK_HTTP_ERROR - NETWORK_ERROR - EXCHANGE_POLYMARKET_API_ERROR - EXCHANGE_POLYMARKET_UNAUTHORIZED - EXCHANGE_POLYMARKET_MARKET_CLOSED - EXCHANGE_POLYMARKET_RATE_LIMITED - EXCHANGE_KALSHI_API_ERROR - EXCHANGE_KALSHI_UNAUTHORIZED - EXCHANGE_KALSHI_MARKET_CLOSED - EXCHANGE_ERROR - EXCHANGE_UNSUPPORTED - SIGNATURE_EIP712_FAILED - SIGNATURE_ERROR - GAS_ESTIMATION_FAILED - TRANSACTION_FAILED - GAS_SPONSORSHIP_FAILED - TRANSACTION_TIMEOUT - MARKET_NOT_READY - MARKET_PAUSED - MARKET_INSUFFICIENT_LIQUIDITY - ORDERBOOK_UNAVAILABLE - MARKET_FOK_NOT_FILLED - MARKET_ORDER_SIZE_EXCEEDS_MAX - DATABASE_ERROR - DATABASE_CREDENTIAL_DECRYPTION_FAILED - INTERNAL_ERROR example: FUNDS_INSUFFICIENT_USDC OrderErrorAction: type: object description: An actionable recovery step a client can surface to the end user. required: - action - label - primary properties: action: $ref: '#/components/schemas/OrderErrorActionType' label: type: string description: Human-readable button/link label. example: Add Funds url: type: string nullable: true primary: type: boolean description: Whether this is the primary/recommended action. OrderErrorActionType: type: string description: Machine-readable recovery-action identifier, snake_case on the wire. enum: - enable_trading - reenable_trading - update_policies - regenerate_api_key - contact_support - retry - review_order - adjust_price - adjust_size - browse_markets - refresh_market - create_new_order - add_funds - reduce_size - swap_usdc - add_matic - approve_usdc - approve_ctf - retry_approval - wait_and_retry - check_status - use_limit_order - update_kalshi_credentials - enable_bridge_funding responses: ExecUnauthorized: description: > No valid credential presented — missing/invalid API-key headers or an invalid/expired session token. content: application/json: schema: type: object required: - error properties: error: type: string example: Unauthorized securitySchemes: apiKeyClientId: type: apiKey in: header name: X-Client-Id description: >- Credential client id (`kairos_ck_...`). Must be sent together with X-Api-Key and X-Api-Secret. apiKeyKey: type: apiKey in: header name: X-Api-Key description: 64-char hex API key. apiKeySecret: type: apiKey in: header name: X-Api-Secret description: 64-char hex API secret. ```` This documentation is built and hosted on [Mintlify](https://mintlify.com), a developer documentation platform.